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Principled Silence 
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). 
For the first time in its history, the Supreme Court has drawn a line that 
the state may not cross in its treatment of gay people. In Romer v. Evans, 1 the 
Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of Amendment 2 to the 
Colorado State Constitution, which categorically prohibited gay people from 
obtaining legal protection from discrimination based on their sexual 
orientation .2 The Colorado Supreme Court had held that the right to 
participate in the political process, with which the amendment clearly 
interfered, was a fundamental right requiring strict judicial scrutiny, and that 
the amendment failed that test. 3 The U.S . Supreme Court affirmed on different 
grounds. Writing for a six-member majority, and giv ing short shrift to a 
vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy held that Amendment 2 
was repugnant to the spirit of the Equal Protecti on Cl ause. The Court deployed 
its most deferential standard and found that "Amendment 2 fai Is, even defies, 
this conventional inquiry ... ; it lacks a rational rel ationship to legitimate state 
interests. "4 The majority thereby answered a question that the Court had left 
open in its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick: 5 Can the Equal Protection Clause 
ever be used to strike down anti-gay legislation? In the ten years between 
Bowers and Romer, only one court of appeals had found room for gay people 
inside the Equal Protection Clause. Its insistence, now vindicated, that the 
I. 11 6 S. C t. 1620 ( 1996). 
2. T he parties and the Court ado pted the name "Amendment 2"- the titl e unde r whic h the amendme nt 
was submirted to Colorado voters-for ease of re ferenc e. See id. at 1623 . Ame ndment 2 reads, in full : 
No Protected Status Based o n Ho mosexua l, Lesbian, o r Bisexua l Orienta tio n. Nei ther the State 
of Co lorado, throug h any of its branches or departments, nor any o f its agenc ies , po litical 
subdivisi ons, munic ipal iti es or school di st ric ts, sha ll enact, adopt or enforce any statute, 
regulati on, o rd inance o r po licy whereby ho mosexual, lesbia n o r bisexual o ri entat io n, cond uct , 
practices o r relati onships shall constitute o r otherwise be the bas is of or entitl e any person or 
class o f perso ns to have o r c laim any minority status, quo ta pre ferences, protected status o r 
cl aim of d isc rimin ation. Thi s Secti on o f the Consti tuti on shall be in a ll respec ts se lf-execu ting. 
CO LO. CONST. art. 2, § 30b. 
3. See Evans v. Ro mer, 882 P.2d 133 5 (Co lo. 1994) (en bane). 
4. Romer, 11 6 S. Ct. at 1627. 
5. 478 U.S . 186 ( 1986). Bo wers held tha t a Geo rg ia sta tute proh ibit ing oral o r anal sex between 
consenti ng adul ts did not vio late the Due Process Clause when applied to ho mosexuals. See id. a t 189. The 
Court's previous decisio ns in Griswold v. Conneclicu/, 381 U. S. 479 ( 1965), and Eisensladi v. Saini, 405 
U.S. 43 8 ( 1972 ), suggested that, if appl ied to heterosexuals, the statut e wou ld not have passed consti tut io nal 
muster- a po in t Georg ia conceded . See Bowers,478 U.S. at 2 18 n. IO (Stevens, J. , di ssen tin g). The Court 
did not address that question, see id. at 188 n.2 , nor any c laim of equa l protecti on, see id. at 196 n. S. 
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equal protection and due process claims of gay litigants are analytically distinct 
remained for years as a lone voice amidst an unsympathetic, hostile throng. 6 
Romer is the seminal decision in the jurisprudence of equal protection for 
gay people. As such, it is the beginning of a story, not the end. This Case Note 
argues that Justice Kennedy's carefully crafted opinion foreshadows chapters 
in that story that have yet to be written, shedding light on an issue that Romer 
ultimately leaves unresolved: Do gay people constitute a suspect class that 
merits heightened judicial protection? The Romer Court had two distinct 
ana lytical models upon which to draw, following its two landmark rational 
rev iew cases: an open-ended analysis grounded in principle, as exemplified by 
Reed v. Reec/, 7 or an exhaustive analysis grounded in fact, as exemplified by 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cente1; Inc. 8 It chose the fanner, 
speaking not at all to the factual record on which the lower court had rested 
its decision. That silence carries a message-one that betokens a shift in the 
att itude of the Court toward the claims of gay litigants and casts the more 
strident portions of Justice Scalia's dissent as a harsh counterpo int to its subtle 
theme. To hear this message properly requires attention to context- its absence 
in the majority opinion, and its use in the dissent. 
The Romer maj ority introduces its analysi s with the proposition that 
evaluating the merits of an equal protection claim always depends upon 
" knowing the relation between the ciassification adopted and the object to be 
atta ined ."9 Those laws that the Court has upheld against rational basis 
challenges, it reminds us, have been "narrow enough in scope and grounded 
in a suffici ent factual context for [the Court] to ascerta in that there existed 
some relat ion between the classification and the purpose it served." 10 But the 
majority opinion is remarkably devoid of any di scuss ion of the particular traits 
that serve to define gay people as a c lass . 11 Rather, the majority concludes 
6. The op in io n was written by Jud ge William 1\. Norris o f the Ninth C ircuit Court of Appeal s. 
Compwc Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, I J-10 (9th Ci r. 1988), ,·acared a11<l cJf'd 0 11 other 
grounds, 875 1-.2d 699 (9t h Ci r. 1989) (e n bane) ("'[N]othing in Haniwick suggests that the state may 
penalize gays for their sexual o rientation. . . We cannot read Hwd~< ·ick as standing fo r the proposit ion rh"t 
go ve rnment may o utlaw sodomy only when committed by a disfav ored class o f perso ns.''). ll'ith id. at 135 5 
(Rei nhardt, J. , d issenting) ("The anti-homosexual th rust of Hwrhrick, and the Court's w ill ingness to 
•.:ondone anti-homosexua l animus in the actions of the government. 3rc clear:' '). and, e.g .. Ben-Shalom v. 
[vlarsh, 881 F2d 454, 464-66 (7t h Cir. I 989) (rejecting Judge No rri s's analys is). 
7. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
8. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
9 . Romer, 11 6 S. Ct. at 1627. 
10. Jd. 
II. Richard Evans lev ied a facial chal lenge against Amendment 2. See id at 1632 (Sca lia, J., 
dis se nting). A co urt necessar ily conducts its analysi s of such a chal le nge on a more general ized level , as 
'·the challenger must establi sh that no set of circumstances exist s unde r wh ich the Ac t wou ld be valid ." 
Un ikd Stares v. Sale rno , 48 1 U.S . 739, 745 ( I 987). But the differe nce concerns the type o f facts that are 
relevant, not rhe relevanc e o f facts at all. A facial cha llenge to a restr iction requ ires an inquiry into th e 
relatio nship between the restriction and the class rather than the res triction and the individual litigant. See. 
q.g., Lindsey v. No rme t, -105 U. S 56 , 64-79 (1972) (s triking down po rti ons of O reg o n landlord/tenant 
starute based on E~cii.! l challenge and resting dec ision on charJcteristics of 13ndlord and tenant classes). 
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that no factual context could ever support a c lass ification of such "sheer 
breadth" as Amendment 2. 12 B ut this bol d statement of principle, when 
considered in isolation from the nature of gay people's class status and the 
di scriminarion levi ed against them, seems discontinuous with the Court's 
prev ious equal protection jurisprudence. Class ifications of rights and privileges 
based on age, for example, exhi bit extraordinary breadth in this country: 
Young peop le are categorically excluded from participating in the political 
process, voting, and serving on juries , and older Americans are excluded from 
the private and public sectors al ike through mandatory retirement ages. Yet the 
Supreme Court has upheld such broad class ificat ions on a rational basis 
theory 13 by adverting to those "distinguishing characteristics [of di fferent age 
groups] re levant to interests the State has the authority to implement," 14 and 
to our common interest, as people who age, in protecting both the young and 
the old. 15 Similarly, in Romer, it seems to be the combi nation of the breadth 
of Amendment 2, the nature of the classification, and the identity of its target 
that so offends the Constitution. On thi s comb inatio n of factors, however; th e 
majo rity is silent. 
12. Rumer. 116 S. Ct. at ! 627. The majo rity offers an alternati ve explanati on for its result. Obse rvi r. ~ 
that Amendment 2 "impos[es] a broad and undifferentiated di sability on a :; ingle named group," it op ines 
that "[a] law dec laring that in gen~ral it shall be more diffic ult for one group of citizens than for ail others 
to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal se nse." 
id. at i 627- 23. i\ brief tiled by Professors Laurence Tri be , John Hart Ely, Ge ra ld Gunther, Philip Kur land , 
and k athlee n Sull ivan, which desc ribes Amendment 2 as a "per sc violati on o f the Equa l Protectio n 
Clause:' rnay have in flue nced this language. 8ri~ f or LJu rence H. Tribe, et al .. JS Arnici Curi ae in Sup port 
of Respondents at 3, Romer v. Evili1S, 116 S. Ct. ! 620 ( ! 996) (No. 9-! ·1 039). However. the Tribe brief rests 
its :.1rg umcnt Oil 3 reading of ,LI,mendmcnt 2 th ~ll precludes hOI110St'XUU[ity ['rom ··being made the basis for 
an y prokction pursuant to lhe 5l~11r.: ·s h:ws from ~ny instance of discr im in:::tion. however inv iJious (lnd 
un wJ. rrantcd,'' icl.-that i:; , on-;: that exempts gay peop le even from rati onal bas is rev ie\\~ The Court 
acknowledges that such a rc:.H.!ing is poss ibk but finds it unnecessa ry to its disposit ion o f the ca::;e. See 
Rom:.:r. 116 S. Ct. at ! 626 ("I~ is :} fa ir. if ~iGt JJCc•=ssary. infen: nce. that [tile amc ndrncntl dcp ri vl: s gays 
:l!ld k::;h ians even of the prot e;.; t\u1~ of St !~er ~d b'.VS and pol ici..:-s thai prohibit arbitrary discrimination 
Th~ sta~e court diJ not deci.J:= \\'hdil·.::r ih \~ Gmend rnt:nt has this effect. howevc1~ und neither need wt;. :') . 
f,,lon:·over, lhc i1i ujo riry itself 3 l:~gc sis a more ap prop ri 1tc C(Jntcxt \\·ithi n \\'hi ch to re:.±d it.:s a!krn:.nivc 
explana!ion- tht Court \ r·~jectio n of segregation and :5e(:o nd-c lass citizenship in Brown 1: Board .. ~( 
Education. 347 U.S. 4~L) (195-~.L The maj ority's j udg men t that Amendmen t 2 is a ' 'd eni~1 l of eq ua l 
pi·otcct io n ... in t h~ most liter<.: ! sense,'' Ro;ner, \ l6 S. Ct. at 1623, and her~cc not amenable i.o the type 
of ba iancing normail y required by the ~~.J~lal ?rottr.t ion Clause, ec hoes :ts hoid i!1g in Bruwn tint "'[s]epa rat e 
t~duca ti on~:!l faciiities ore inherenrl y un=.:quaL" Bru:,·n. 3...;.7 U.S. ar 495. Likcwis•:. tl:e Ro,n..:r majority's 
admonition that •·[i]t is not '}.:ith in our cv!1sti tL:ti onai tt::td iti,_::,n to C!13Ct L-!\VS of thi s so rt, " Ronu..•r, 116 S. Ct. 
at 1628. is po\V'~rful ly evo;.;rrtiv -:: of the Coun ·s judgn-:ent in Bolling ' -: Sharpe, 3-i/ U.S. -} 97 ( 1954 ). t h~ 
companion case ~o BnJit?7. that "[cjlassiRcations based solely upon race. an: 1:ontrary to our traditions 
and hence const itutional ly susp~:~ct. : · /d. ;;~t 499. The Romer majority clearly invites the comparison \Vith 
Brown and Balling: It opens !ts opinion ;,o,·ith Justice Ha rlan's ringing di ssent in P!es.\y v Ferxusun ~ 163 
U.S. 537 (I 896), (he· cwse that Broll 'n r':_i -=:ckJ> and ccnsp icuous ly cites to SH 'UJff t Painter , 339 U.S. 6:29 
{_1950), one of il!tHt·n's progenli:..;rs . for a pi·Gposit~<:i1 0f !:.:t w that origina:ed, not in .)~wean. but in Shei!ey 
:-: Kranli;r, 33--J. U.S . i ( 19~ 8 ). S[!i.! RcJ.':ter. l !S ~.C t..~[ 1623, \6 28 (' " Equal proti.!C ti on of the Lnvs is not 
achit:ve:d through indi scrimin ~:c imposit ion cr if! equ~l l it! cs.'. ') (quoting s\I 'Cllll, 339 U.S. at 635 (quo li ng 
Shelley, 33-l US. at 22)) . 
13. 3~:e fVlass :-tchusens BJ. of i\e:ti re:::•::m '>'. iV!ti~gi 3. ~~27 U.S. 307 ( i 976) (app lying r:1 tiona l b3sis 
anal sis to age discrimino.tion:l. 
-L Cleburne v. Cl~bu rnc Li \· ~ng C~r .. l:-Jc .. 473 U.S. -f32. -~ ~! ( 193:5 ) (discuss in:; Afwgio). 
5. 5:ee .\!urgia _ ~LZ7 U.S. 2. ~ 3i3~ !4 . 
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Such reticence calls to mind the Court's opinion in Reed v. Reed. 16 
There, parties to a probate action challenged an Idaho statute giving men an 
automatic prefe rence over women for appointment as estate administrators. 17 
The Court struck down the statute-the first time it had invalidated a law on 
the basis of sex discrimination- holding insufficient the State's interests in 
administrative efficiency and the reduction of intrafamily controversy. 18 As 
in Romer, the Court employed a rational basis test; 19 and, as in Romer, the 
Court did not engage in a particulari zed analysi s of the classification, despite 
a clearly hostile precedent"0 and despite the Idaho legislature's finding that 
" in general men are better qualified to act as an administrator than are 
women ."21 Rather, Reed's holding was briefly stated and broadly worded: "To 
give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members o f the 
other, merely to accompli sh the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to 
make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal 
Protection Clause .... " 22 Thus, the decision in Reed was extremely open-
ended. While the Court took no position on heightened scrutiny for sex 
discrimination/ 3 it a lso prov ided no fact-based analys is that could have lent 
support to a future determ ination that a gender class ification was, in fact, 
rationally related to a leg itimate end . 
Reed is now recogni zed as the case th at ushered in the era of heightened 
scrutiny for gender discrimination 24 As Justice Ginsburg wrote in the VMI 
case, "[s]ince Reed, the Court has repeatedly recognized that neither fe deral 
nor state govemment acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when 
a law or o ffici a l policy den ies to women, simply because they are women, full 
c itizenship stature."25 Reed's open-ended , principled structure signal ed th e 
16. 404 U.S. 71 ( 1971). 
17. Seeid.at71 - 72. 
18. See id. at 76-77. 
19. See id. at 76 ('"The questio n presented. is whe th e r a di ffe renc e in the sex of com pe t ing 
applicants ... bears a rational relationsh ip to a state objective .... " ). 
20. See Goesaert v. C leary, 335 U.S. 464,465- 66 ( 1948) (uphold ing Mich igan's right to draw " a sharp 
line bet ween the sexes' ' and to for bid women to work as ba rtenders). The Reed Court declined even to cite 
Goesaert,just as the Romer majo rity refused to d iscuss Bo\l'ers. As in Reed, the Romer majo rity's refusal 
to acknowledge hosti le precedent may call into question th at precedents continuing vitality. Compw~ 
Nabozny v. Pod lesny, No. 95 -3634 , 1996 U.S . A pp. LEX IS 18866. at *33 n.l2 (7th Cir. Jul y 31, 1996) 
("Of co urse, Bowers will soo n be ec lipsed in the area of equa l pro tecti on by the Supreme Court 's hold ing 
in Romer " Evans.") (ci tatio n omitted). with Ben-S halom v. i'vl arsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th C ir. 1989) 
("Althoug h the [Bowers] Court ana lyzed th e constitutiona lity of the statute [before it) o n a due process 
rather tha n equa l protection basi s, Han/wick ne vert hele ss impacts o n the sc rutin y aspects under a n equal 
protection a nalysi s."), and Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620. 1629, 163 1- 33 ( 1996) (Sca li a, J. , dissenting) 
(arguing that Romer hol d ing ·'con trad icts" Bowers ho ld ing and that decisions cannot be reco nc il ed) . 
21. Reed v. Reed, 465 P.2d 635. 638 (Idaho 1970). 
22 . Reed v. Reed, 404 U S 71, 76-77 ( 1971 ). 
23. The Idaho Supreme Court had made no ruli ng on the issue . See Reed, 465 P.2d a t 635. S imilarly, 
in Romer, th e state tria l court reje cted the c la im that gay peop le co nstitute a suspec t c lass, an d the plainti ITs 
elected not to appeal the ru li ng. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 133 5, 1341 n.3 (Co lo. 1994) (en bane). 
24. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S . 190 , 197- 98 ( 1976) (ide ntifyi ng Reed as progenitor of cases 
applying hei ghten ed sc rutiny to gender di sc riminati on). 
25. Un ited States v. Vi rgin ia, 116 S. Ct. 2264. 2275 ( 1996). 
-------------------------~ 
1996] Case Note 251 
Co urt's awareness of women's need for constitutional protection and set the 
stage for a later, explicit adoption of a heightened standard of review. 
The language and analytical structure of Reed and Romer, and the 
subsequent hi story of Reed, stand in sharp contrast to the Court's other 
landmark rational basis opinion, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
Inc. 26 In Cleburne, the plaintiffs challenged a zoning ordinance that gave 
di sfavored treatment to the mentally retarded. On revievv, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals granted them relief, holding that the mentally retarded 
constitute a quasi-suspect class calling for a heightened standard of judicial 
review, a standard the ordinance failed to satisfy.27 The Supreme Court, per 
Justice White, affirmed the Fifth Circuit 's resu lt on different grounds: It 
rejected any heightened standard of protection for the mentally retarded but 
found that the ordinance could not survive even rational basis scrutiny. 28 
The majority grounds each stage of its analysis in Cleb urne in a highly 
particu larized discussion of the class of mentally retarded people and the Texas 
ordinance that operated to their detriment. First, in rej ecting the application of 
heightened scrutiny, the Court investigates the definiti on of mental retardation 
and the problems that attend its treatment, th e avenues for legal reli ef already 
available to the mentally retarded, and th e sympathetic representation that the 
group receives in the political process. 29 Then, in find ing that the zon ing 
ordinance nonetheless fail s rational basis scrutin y, it analyzes with particularity 
the stated purposes of the legislature, exp laining why they fail to save the 
ordinance. 30 Unlike its opinions in Reed and Romer, the Cleburne Court's 
exhaustive factual analysis leaves no room for subsequent liti gants to shift the 
analytical paradigm with evidence of their disfavored class status. 
Indeed , the Cleburne majority reaches out to forec lose any avenue shot1 
of outright reversal for according heightened scrutiny to the mentally retarded. 
As Justice Marshall points out in his dissent, "because the Court invalidates 
Cleb urne's zoning ordinance on rational basis grounds, the Court's wide-
ranging discussion of heightened scrutiny is wholly superflu ous to th e deci sion 
of this case."31 Apparentl y recognizing that future courts might take hi s 
invalidation of the Cleburne ordinance as a step toward heightened scrutiny, 
Justice White abandons judicial restraint and engages the issue . 
Such restrictive overreaching is entirely absent from both Reed and Romer. 
In Reed, the Court declines to address the State's contention that men are more 
qualified th an women to administer estates32 In Romer, the Cout1 bare ly 
26. 4 73 U.S. 432 ( 1985). 
27. See Cleburne Li v ing Ctr. , Inc. v. Ci ty of C leburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5 th Ci r. 1984). 
28. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435,442, 447-4 8. 
29. See id at 442-46 & 442 n.9. 
30 . See id at 44 7-50. 
3 1. Id at 456 (;'vlarsh all, L di ssenti ng). 
32 See Reed v. Reed. 404 US. 7 1. 75- 77 (197 1). 
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mentions Colorado's asserted interests in prioritizing discrimination claims, 
protecting intimate association, and discouraging politica l factionalism 33 T he 
Romer Court also leaves unexam ined the question of whether political 
participation constitutes a fundamental right,34 an inquiry that would require 
a di scussion as to whether the denial of that right only to gay people is, or is 
not, constitutional. Romer tracks Reed, rather than Cleburne, employ ing a 
rational basis review that would be entirely consistent with a fu ture 
determination that gay people require heightenedjudicia l pro tection. 
Justice Scalia 's extraordinary di ssent in Romer takes on a more definite 
shape in light of the fo regoing ana lysis. The Justice refers to gay li t igants' civil 
rights struggle as a "Kulturkampf," an assault upon the "traditional sexual 
mores" of " tolerant" commonfolk. 35 Homosexua ls, he writes, are a 
"geographically concentrated and politically powerful minority" with "high 
disposable income" who have successfull y aligned themselves with an el ite 
"lawyer c lass," the "knights rather than the villeins," "Templars" w ho have 
betrayed the more "plebeian attitudes" of true citizens. 36 
When a Supreme Court Justice authors a dissent that uses such language 
to describe the patiies requesting re lief,37 we must strive to understan d the 
impetus behind his words. In Romer, Justi ce Scalia's impetus was the neeQ.Jo 
respond to the majority's careful ly schooled, suggestive s ilence. The trad it ional 
test fo r a discrete and insular minority meriting he ightened judicia l scrutiny 
requires, inter al ia, a showing that the group is unable to find protection in the 
po li tical process.38 There are strong arguments supporting the conc lu sion that 
gay people satisfy this requ irement 3 9 Justice Kennedy does not engage these 
arguments at all, however, causing Justice Scalia's diatribe in seeming res ponse 
to them to appear, at first blush, li ke gratui tous shadow-boxing . But it is 
Romer's very silence on the question of heightened scrutiny, and on the factual 
inqu iries that m ight eventually support its app lication , that inspires Justice 
Sca lia to such rheto rica l depths. As Reed lc Reed de monstra tes , s ilence, when 
properly deployed, can testify to a fun damental shift in the Co.trt's attitude 
toward di scrimination against a d is favored group. Justice Kennedy's op in ion 
suggests that anothe r such shift may have occurred. 
- Tobias Barrington i;VoUJ 
~o. See Romer v. Evans. 116 S. Ct. 1620, i 629 ( !996). 
34. But see Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (opi nin g that ' ·government and each of it s parts [should) rema in 
open on imparti:.d te rms to al! who seek its ass istance."). 
35. Id. at l629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
36. id at 1634-37. 
37. Lj. Akhi! Reed Amai, A!la inder and .-1meildmenl 2: Romed· Rig htness , 94 ~;l!Cl!. L. RE v . 
(fort hco ming Oct. 1'196) (man uscri pt at 30 &. n. l 38, on tile wiih the lilie Low Jowna/) (d isc uss ing 
overto nes of di ssen' · ..,·ith refe re nce to persecution of gays and Jcv,s during Wo r!d War II ). 
38 . See. c g. Fro nt icro v. Richardson .'~!! U. S 677. 685-86 & nn. l 4 & 17 (1 9 73 ). 
39 . See, t!. g. ~ Kenji Yoshino. Susp ect Symbols: T fu: Lirerary Arg ument .for /{ eighte ned Sc.:ruiinyfo;· 
Gavs , 96 C Ol.Uo!. L. REV . (to nhcoming No v. 1996) (manuscript at 57-92, on fi le with <he ]2;/e Law 
Jo urr:af) (discussi ng disadvantages gays face in fi nding sympathet ic repres~ ntation in pol itic:.J. l process) . 
